Progress of the Law by Editors,
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ATTORNEYS.
The general employment of an attorney to defend a case
is an entire contract, and if he withdraws without cause,
Right to or is discharged for justifiable reasons, before
Compensation the contract is completed, he cannot maintain
an action for the value of his services: Supreme Court of
California in Cahill v. Baird, 70 Pac. io6i. See also
Holmes v. Evans, 129 N. Y. 14o. In Walsh v. Shumway,
65 Ills. 471, the court suggests the modification that the
case is different "where an attorney has been retained with-
out a specific contract," but no such restriction is made
in this case or in Moyers v. Graham, 15 Lea, 6o.
CARRIERS.
in Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Harris, 32 Southern, 309, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi holds that where a round-
Through trip ticket is sold, good only for one day, it is
Trains good for a return trip on the only train return-
ing that day, though such train is not scheduled to stop at
the station of purchase. See Head v. Railway Co., 79 Ga.
358.
A railroad company sold a ticket for itself and as agent
of a connecting line, limiting its liability for any injury to
Limitationof a passenger to its own line. The Supreme
uablity Court of South Carolina holds in Oliver v.
Columbia, etc., R. Co., 43 S. E. 307, that it was, neverthe-
less, responsible to a passenger for an injury caused by neg-
ligence on a track of a connecting line, over which it was
accustomed to run its cars for a short distance before turn-
ing them over to the connecting line, and this though the
conductor moves his train under orders from the connecting
line.
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CONFESSIONS.
A promise that, if one charged with a crime will confess,
he will be protected by those having him in charge against
Inducement the wrath of others implicated in the crime, does
not render the confession inadmissible, if other-
wise voluntary: Supreme Court of Alabama in Hunt v.
State, 33 Southern, 329. "The promise which will render
a confession involuntary, in the eyes of the law, must have
relation to the legal consequences of the offence itself.
• . . The mere collateral benefit of protection from the
personal violence of those who acted with him in the com-
mission of the crime will not suffice."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
In Kennedy v. Mayor of Pawtucket, 53 At. 317, the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island holds that a statute, provid-
Delegation of ing for the appointment of commissioners to
Legislative divide a city into not more than seven wards,
Power in such manner as to secure, as nearly as may
be, an equal number of electors in each ward, having regard
to the number of inhabitants, and to divide the wards into a
convenient number of voting districts, is not unconstitu-
tional as a delegation of legislative power; the acts to be
done by the commissioners being only administrative and
ministerial. See City of Jacksonville v. L'Engle, 20 Fla.
344-
In Indiana the statute law prohibits the assignment of
wages to become due to employes, and declares invalid
Assignment any agreement whereby an employer is relieved
of Future from weekly paying to his employe his full
Wages wages. In International Text-Book Co. -v.
Weissinger, 65 N. E. 521, the Supreme Court of Indiana
holds that in view of the importance to the state of the well-
being of the wage-earners and in view of the temptations
to sacrifice future earnings, the disability imposed by the
act constitutes a lawful exercise of the police power, and is
not in violation of the Constitution, either as an unreason-
able restraint upon the liberty of the citizen, or as a depriva-
tion of property without due process of law. See Railroad
Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (CONTINUED).
A law granting a pension to the widow of a policeman
who had died several years before its enactment is uncon-
Pensions stitutional as an appropriation of money to
private purposes: People v. Partridge, 65 N. E.
164. See also the recent case of Mahon v. Board, 171
N. Y. 263, 63 N. E. 1107.
In Neas v. Borches, 71 S. W. 50, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee holds that an act of the state providing special
terms for sales in bulk of stocks of merchandise,
Regulation otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade,
of Sales
and declaring that such sales shall be deemed
fraudulent unless the parties make an inventory five days
before the sale, and the purchaser makes diligent inquiry as
to creditors of the seller, and gives them five days' notice
of the sale, stating the cost price and the price to be paid,
is a valid regulation of such business and not unconstitu-
tional as class legislation or as depriving persons of the free-
dom of contract guaranteed under the interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. One judge
dissents. See Third Nat. Bank v. Divine Grocery Co., 97
Tenn. 611.
Trespasses on the property rights of an individual, com-
mitted by public officers" or agents professedly acting under
Due Process authority of a state law, but which are not only
of Law, State not authorized by such law, but by a fair con-
Agencies struction of it are prohibited, cannot be imputed
to the state so as to bring them within the constitutional in-
hibition to deprive persons of property without due process
of law, and on that ground to confer jurisdiction on a fed-
eral court to grant relief: U. S. Circuit Court (S. D. New
York) in Huntington v. City of New York, 118 Fed. 683.
See Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U. S.
226.
With two judges dissenting, the New York Supreme
Court (Appellate Division, Fourth Department) holds in
Service of Goldie v. Goldie, 79 N. Y. Supp. 268, that an
Order order to show why one should not be punished
for contempt for failure to pay alimony, served on the at-
torney of the defendant, is void, and in violation of the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States declar-
ing that no one shall be deprived of liberty or property
without due process of law. See McComb v. Weaver, ii
Hun. 271.
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The Georgia Code provides in general that where goods
are shipped over the lines of connecting carriers under con-
Compulsory tracts whereby the first carrier is liable only as
Giving of a forwarder, and are lost, it shall be the duty of
Information the initial or connecting carrier, upon applica-
tion by the shipper, "to trace said freight and inform said
applicant in writing, when, where, how and by which
carrier said freight was lost, damaged or destroyed, and the
names of the parties and their official positions, if any, by
whom the truth of the fact set out in said information can
be established. If the carrier to which application is made
shall fail to trace said freight, and give said information
in writing, within the time prescribed, then said carrier shall
be liable for the value of the freight lost, damaged or
destroyed, in the same manner, and to the same extent as if
said loss, damage, or destruction occurred on its line." In
Central Ry. Co. of Georgia v. Murphey, 43 S. E. 265, the
Supreme Court of Georgia holds this very important statute
constitutional.
CORPORATIONS.
The Court of Appeals of New York holds in People v.
American Loan and Trust Co., 65 N. E. 200, that while
Insolvency, interest is allowed, as against an insolvent cor-
Preferences, poration or it stockholders, if the assets are suf-
Interest ficient for that purpose, on the settlement of an
insolvent corporation, where a receiver has been appointed,
no interest is allowed after such appointment, as between
preferred and unpreferred creditors. See also Thomas v.
Car Co., 149 N. S. 116.
COURTS.
In Jersey City, etc., Ry. Co. v. New York, etc., Ry. Co.,
53 Atl. 709, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds that
Jurisdiction when two railways cross each other at grade,
and, being unable to agree upon proper pro-
visions for protection against collision, submit that question
to the determination of the court, it has jurisdiction to de-
termine it.
PROGRESS OF -THE LAW.
CRIMINAL LAW.
In an indictment for larceny by a bailee, it is necessary to
allege the name of the bailor, and in concise terms the pur-
Larceny by pose or use for which the property was intrusted
Bailee to the defendant; for this is an essential ulti-
mate fact, which must be proven in order to sustain the
indictment: Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Holton,
92 N. W. 541. See People v. Poggi, 19 Cal. 6oo.
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT.
The Ohio statutes provide that an action for injuries by
wrongful death shall be brought for the exclusive benefit
Right of certain relatives of the deceased person, "and
of Action, it shall be brought in the name of the personal
Parties representative of the deceased person." The
father of one wrongfully killed in Ohio, being a resident of
Indiana, brought suit in his own name in Indiana, claiming
under the Ohio statute. In Fabel v. Cleveland, etc., Ry.
Co., 65 N. E. 929, the Appellate Court of Indiana (Division
No. 2) holds that, the right of recovery being in derogation
of the common law, the only party who could bring the
action, whatever might be the provisions of the Indiana
statute in regard to similar cases, was the personal repre-
sentative, as designated in the Ohio statute. See Usher v.
R. R. Co., 126 Pa. 206.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds in Marsh v.
Western New York & P. Ry. Co., 53 AtI., IOOI, that the
Assignment right of action of a widow to recover damages
of Claim for the wrongful death of her husband is one
for unliquidated damages in an action sounding in tort, and
may not be assigned. Since in such action, the measure of
damages is strictly the pecuniary loss sustained the sound-
ness of this decision may well be questioned. See Quin v.
Moore, 15 N. Y. 432.
DOWER.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
First Department) holds in Nichols v. Park, 79 N. Y.
Equltabl- Supp. 547, that a husband who paid for land,
interests but who had the title conveyed to his brother
to prevent his wife's dower right attaching, had neither
seisin in fact nor in law of the land, but at most a mere
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equitable right to a conveyance which was not such seisin
as would give rise to inchoate right of dower; and the mere
fact that the husband went into immediate possession of
the land, and continued therein until his death, did not give
him the necessary seisin. It is further held, in line with these
principles that where a husband contracts to take the title
to land in his own name, but afterwards takes it in the name
of another, his wife will have no dower right in the land,
for the equitable interest which he has in the land while it
is thus under contract to him is terminated by the convey-
ance, and it is only in such equitable interests as he has at
his death that she can claim dower. See Clybourn v. Rail-
way Co., 4 Ills. App. 463, and Douglas v. Douglas, I I Hun.
406.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
The Supreme Court of Kansas holds in Atchison, etc.,
Ry. Co. v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., 70 Pac. 939, that one
Rightof Way. railway corporation may, under the general
Railroads statutes of eminent domain, condemn for its
right of way real estate belonging to another railway cor-
poration not in actual and necessary use for railway pur-
poses. "The mere fact that land is owned by one railroad
company does not forbid its acquisition by another. Ex-
clusiveness of right must depend upon reasonable requisite-
ness."
EVIDENCE.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
Fourth Department) holds in Johnson v. Cole, 78 N. .Y.
Decarations Supp. 489, that detached declarations of a
of Person parent subsequent to transfers of property to his
SinceDeceased children are not admissible after his death to
show that the transfers were gifts, and not advancements;
he having no such interest in the question as to make his
declarations against interest. But see in opposition to this
view Gunn v. Thurston, 130 Mo. 654.
How far evidence may be given of occurrences similar
to the occurrence in question is frequently somewhat diffi-
Similar cult to decide. If it is relevant evidence it is
Facts so, it seems, for some other purpose than to
show the happening of the occurrence in question. Thus
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in DuBois v. People, 65 N. E. 658, the Supreme Court of
Illinois holds that where A. is alleged to have been a party
to a certain "confidence game," evidence may be given of
other like transactions in which he took the part of the
principal actor, in order to show guilty knowledge on his
part. See Cook v. Moore, ii Cush. 213.
EXCAVATIONS.
The Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds in Murray
v. Pannaci, 53 At. 595, that where it appears that the ex-
injury to cavation of sand from a portion of the sea-
Neighboring shore by the owner thereof will, by the law of
Land gravitation, and by wave motion, result in the
removal of adjoining soil of another, and that such latter
removal will expose the land of a third party to the action
of the waves, the third party is entitled to an injunction
restraining the excavation. See Attorney-General v. Tom-
line, 12 Ch. Div. 214, and Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53.
FEDERAZ COURTS.
In Berry v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., iiS Fed. 9II, it
appeared that the plaintiff had sued two defendants on a
Removal of joint and several liability, one residing in the
Causes same state, and the other a non-resident. No
process was served on the resident defendant, and, the
cause being called for trial, the non-resident defendant ap-
peared, and moved that the plaintiff be required to elect
whether she would dismiss as to the resident defendant or
continue the cause for service. She declined to do either,
but requested that the cause proceed to trial as to the
non-resident defendant; whereupon such defendant pre-
sented its petition for removal to the federal court. Under
these facts the U. S. Circuit Court (D. Kansas, First
Division) holds that the plaintiff's election to proceed to
trial against the non-resident defendant alone operated as
a severance of the controversy, and entitled the non-resident
defendant to remove the cause. See notes to Robbins v.
Ellenbogen, i8 C. C. A. 86, and Mecke v. Mineral Co., 35
C. C. A. 155.
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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.
In an action to set aside a deed as in fraud of creditors
of the grantee's husband, it appeared that a third party,
Husband holding the land as security for a debt from the
and Wife husband, and wishing to make a gift to the
wife, conveyed it, with the husband's consent, to the wife,
and afterwards, and as a part of the same transaction, can-
celled the indebtedness of the husband. Under these cir-
cumstances the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
holds in Blossom v. Negus, 65 N. E. 846, that the convey-
ance was not subject to be set aside as a voluntary convey-
ance from a trustee of the husband, to the wife. See Lynde
v.McGregor, 13 Allen, 182.
GIFTS.
In Ranney v. Bowery Say. Bank, 79 N. Y. Supp. 487,
the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Term) holds
Savings-Bank that a rule of a savings bank forbidding any
Deposit gift of a deposit, except by an assignment in
writing, duly acknowledged, does not bind one who became
a depositor after the rule was made, though she had agreed
that notices as to deposits should be deemed and taken as
personal notices, and though the rule had been posted in
the bank for many years before her death.
GIFTS MORTIS CAUSA.
In Blazo v. Cochrane, 53 Atl. 1O26, the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire holds that where one who had taken
Ensuing poison with the intent of committing suicide,
Death after antidotes had been administered, stated to
the physician that if the poison did not kill him, he had
something which would, and that he was not going to live
any longer, and gave the physician a package containing
an unindorsed note and money, telling him to deliver it to
the claimant, and after the physician had gone, such person
took nitric acid, which killed him, a finding that the gift
mortis causa was conditional on his dying of the peril then
existing, and therefore ineffectual, was justified. "While
it is not a legal requisite that he should die of the disease or
peril from which he apprehends death, he must not recover
from it, and his death must result from a disease or peril
existing at the time the gift was made." See also Cutting
v. Gilman, 41 N. H. 147.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE.
With two judges dissenting the Court of Appeals of
New York holds in Servis v. Servis, 65 N. E. 270, that in
Alienation an action by a wife against her husband's parents
of for alienating his affections and inducing him
Affections to abandon her, where there was evidence from
which it appeared that his affections were alienated before
the acts of the defendants which were charged to have
caused the alienation, it was error to refuse to instruct that
if at the time the plaintiff's husband abandoned her be had
no affection for her, or if it had been previously alienated,
she could not recover.
In Potter v. Skiles, 71 S. W. 627, the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky holds that where, after a debtor's land was
Inchoate sold on execution, he conveyed his equity of re-
Dower, demption to one who redeemed from the sale,
Release and, in order to obtain full title, procured from
the debtor's wife a release of her inchoate dower, the
creditors of the husband were not interested in the sum
paid to her for such release, and could not require that it be
applied in payment of their claims, though the amount paid
her was greater than the court might deem her interest to
be worth. "Of course, if it had been made to appear that
Smith had conveyed his property, which otherwise would
have been subject to his creditors, to a vendee, who paid
the consideration to the debtor's wife nominally as dower,
but as a matter of fact for the debtor's interest, the arrange-
ment would be a fraud, and the subterfuge would not be
allowed to stay the court's remedial process."
INJUNCTION.
An injunction will not be granted at the suit of the pro-
prietors of a store to enjoin sympathizers with labor unions
"Picketing" from picketing the store and circulating in its
Store vicinity printed cards asking union men to keep
away from it, and endeavoring to keep them and the public
away by persuasion and peaceable means: New York Su-
preme Court (Special Term, Onondaga County) in Foster
v. Protective Association, 78 N. Y. Supp. 86o. Nor does
the fact that a number of persons co-operated in the picket-
ing of a store, and persuading the public to keep away
from the same, render their acts illegal. See Association
v. Cfnmming, 17o N. Y. 315. The court regards the ques-
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tion as hitherto unsettled. Compare an article by Justice
Holmes in 8 Harvard Law Review, I.
INSURANCE.
Where a life policy provided that suit thereon should be
brought within six months after the death of the insured,
Action, an action brought after such time is barred
umitation, unless such provision has been waived. In an
Waiver action on a life policy, commenced in due time,
the service of summons and complaint were set aside as
unauthorized. Thereafter the plaintiff brought suit, but
after the expiration of the time limited for such an action.
The plaintiff, three or four days after the death of the
insured, had delivered to the defendant the proofs of death,
together with the policy, and an assignment thereof to her
which papers were thereafter retained by the defendant.
In Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 65 N. E.
268, the Court of Appeals of New York holds that these
facts do not show a waiver of the limitations set forth in
the policy. Three judges dissent.
In Brooks v. Erie Fire Ins. Co., 78 N. Y. Supp. 748, the
New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Third De-
Condition a- partment) holds that the condition of a policy
to ownership, that the interest of the insured be that of an
Waiver unconditional and sole owner, and that he own
the land in fee simple, is waived, the insurer's agent being
informed that the insured's interest is but that of a vendee
in possession, though the insured makes a false representa-
tion as to who holds the property. This misrepresentation
it is held does not prevent the waiver, whatever operation
it may have a's an independent defence or as ground for a
separate action for damages. One judge dissents. See
Robbins v. Insurance Co., 149 N. Y. 477.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
In Nason v. Tobey, 65 N. E. 389, the Supreme Judicial
Court of IVlassachusetts holds that while the landlord is
Right to entitled to manure made on the farm in the
Manure ordinary course of husbandry, where a large
part of the manure made was the product of feed not grown
on the farm, but purchased by the tenant, the latter was
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entitled to a proportionate part of the manure. Compare
Lewis v. Lyman, 22 Pick. 437, 442.
LICENSEE.
The Supreme Court of Illinois holds in Illinois Cent. R.
Co. v. Hopkins, 65 N. E. 656, that evidence that the plain-
what tiff had for eight years carried meals to mail
Constitutes clerks on the defendant's railroad cars under an
agreement with the clerks and with the knowledge and
consent of the defendant, authorized the jury to find that
the plaintiff, in carrying the meals, was on the defendant's
premises on its implied invitation in a matter in which it
was interested, and the plaintiff was not a mere licensee to
whom the defendant owed no duty other than not to injure
her wantonly. "To come under an implied invitation, as
distinguished from a mere license, the visitor must come
for a purpose connected with the business in which the occu-
pant is engaged, or which he permits to be carried on there.
There must be same mutuality of interest in the subject to
which the visitor's business relates, although the particular
thing which is the subject of the visit may not be for the
benefit of the occupant." Pumner v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426.
RECEEIVRS.
Where, pending proceedings for the appointment of a
receiver, one who is largely interested in the continuance of
Compeasa. the debtor's business, and also creditor to a
tion,Receiver, large amount, agrees with the debtor that if he
Consideration will recommend his appointment as receiver,
and he is appointed, he will act without compensation, and
the debtor and other creditors relying on such agreement,
consent to such appointment, no compensation should be
allowed the receiver, though claimed in his final report:
Appellate Court of Indiana (Division No. 2), in Polk v.
Johnson, 65 N. E. 536.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds in Bonacum v.
Harrington, 91 N. W. 886, that the courts will not review
Supervision the judgments or acts of the governing authori-
of Courts ties of a religious organization with reference to
its internal affairs for the purpose of ascertaining their regu-
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larity or accordance with the discipline and usages of such
organization. See Pounder v. Ashe, 63 N. W. 886. But
when the governing body of such an organization has de-
prived one of its clergymen of his authority to officiate as
such, he may be enjoined from making use of church prop-
erty in that capacity, or under color of the functions of which
he has been deprived.
SAVINGS BANKS.
The by-laws of a savings bank provided, as is generally
the case in these institutions, that the institution would not
Payment of be responsible for loss, where a depositor had
DeposIt, not given notice that his pass-book had been
By-Law lost or stolen, if the deposit should have been
paid on presentation of the book. In Kingsley v. Whitman
Savings Bank, 65 N. E. i6i, where the bank sought to
rely on this by-law to escape liability, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts holds that, where a bank paid money
to one presenting the pass-book, and forged orders pur-
porting to be signed by the depositor, the by-law afforded
the bank no defence, as it authorized a payment to one
falsely personating the depositor. See and compare Levy
v. Bank, I i 7 Mass. 448.
SCHOOL TRUSTEES.
The statutes of Idaho provide that a school trustee shall
not be pecuniarily interested in any contract made by the
Interest in board of which he is a member, and that any
Contracts contract made in violation of this provision shall
be void. This statutory enactment finds its counterpart in
the legislation of most of the states, and this fact lends more
than local interest to the decision of the Supreme Court of
Idaho in Nuckols v. Lyle, 70 Pac. 40, where it is held that
a contract made with the wife of one member of the board
of trustees, employing her to teach in the school over which
such board has supervision is contrary to public policy, and
is void by the terms of the statute. It is further said that
the administrative act of the board in entering into this con-
tract could not be reviewed, but payments made under the
contract, it being void, could be enjoined in an action com-
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menced by any taxpayer of the school district. See Adleman
v. Pierce, 55 Pac. 658.
SURETY.
In Sullivan v. McLane, 70 S. W. 949, the Supreme Court
of Texas holds that a surety liable on a note secured on land
Purchaser of the principal, and against whom judgment
for Value has been rendered on the note, in purchasing at
the foreclosure of the lien, he paying the amount of his bid,
and also the balance of the judgment, is a purchaser for
value.
TAXATION.
In Yates v. Royal Ins. Co., 65 N. E. 726, the Supreme
Court of Illinois holds that the mere fact that a statute
Unconstltu. under which taxes are paid is subsequently held
tionnaity of unconstitutional, and for that reason that the
Levy taxes paid were illegally imposed, is not suffi-
cient to authorize an action to recover back the amount paid.
See Elston v. City of Chicago, 4o Ills. 518.
TRLEGRAPH COMPANIES.
A telegram was sent subject to the stipulation very fre-
quently made that the company would not be liable for dam-
Damages, ages unless a written claim was presented within
Written ninety days from the filing of the message. In
Notice Phillips v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 69
S. W. 997, it is held that this stipulation is suf-
ficiently complied with by a suit being brought for damages
for failure to deliver the telegram, and a citation filed on the
company within ninety days from the filing of the message.
TROVER.
In Anderson v. Besser, 91 N. W. 737, the Supreme Court
of Michigan holds that in trover for timber cut by a tres-
Cutting passer in good faith under belief of title, the
Timber, measure of damages is the value at the time of
Damages conversion, less the amount added to its value.
Compare in connection with this case, decisions bearing upon
similar facts in reference to the mining of coal: Wood v.
Morewood, 3 Q. B. 440, note; and Morgan v. Powell, 3 Q.
B. 278.
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In Wilcox v. Morten, 92 N. W. 777, it appeared that the
defendants had been induced by means of the plaintiff's
Technical fraudulent representations to trade their hard-
Conversion, ware stock for land, and discovering the fact
Damages that they had been deceived, seized the stock
for the purpose of rescinding the trade. The seizure was
made on Saturday and on the following Monday they ten-
dered to the plaintiff a deed of the land. Under these facts
the Supreme Court of Michigan holds, in an action of
trover, thereafter brought, that, the defendants having com-
pleted the rescission, the stock ceased to be the plaintiff's
property, and, therefore, though there was a technical con-
version of the stock before the tendering of the deed, the
plaintiff was entitled to recover, if at all, only nominal dam-
ages, so that a judgment far the defendants would not be
set aside. Compare Johnson v. Stear, 15 C. B. N. S. 330,
and Donald v. Suckling, L. R. I Q. B. 585.
TRUSTS.
A wife opened an account in a savings bank in her own
name, in trust for her husband, but before her death she
Deposit In drew out the whole amount. There was no
Bank evidence that she ever informed her husband of
the account, or made any declaration in regard to it. The
New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Second
Department) holds that a trust for the benefit of the hus-
band was shown: Jenkins v. Baker, 78 N. Y. Supp. 1O74.
The court refuses to regard it necessary that the depositor
die leaving the fund existing, which has generally been the
fact in cases similar to this one. Compare Cunningham v.
Davenport, 147 N. Y. 43, and Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y.
134.
WILLS.
Under a will giving to various persons shares of stock in
a corporation,--36 shares in all,-while the testator owned
Bequest of at the date of the will only 31 shares, and at
Stock not his death 25 shares, the residuary gift being,
Owned "all the rest residue and remainder of my
estate," the legacies of stock are held to be general legacies,
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so that the executor will be required to make up the deficit
by purchase: Slade v. Talbot, 65 N. E. 374. Compare the
case of Johnson v. Goss, 128 Mass. 433.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
Fourth Department) holds In re Dake's Will, 78 N. Y.
Revocation Supp. 29, that a declaration by testator that a
laterwill, not produced, revoked his formerwills,
did not furnish sufficient evidence of its contents to comply
with the rule that a former will cannot be revoked except by
another will declaring such revocation, or thoroughly contra-
dictory with the first one. "Even if it should be held that
the statement of the testator as to the contents of his will
was proper proof, we should hold that the declaration in
this case claimed to have been made was nothing more than
the expression by the testator of his opinion as to the legal
effect of his later act. I Jarm. Wills (5th Ed.), p. 338; In
re Williams' Will, 34 Misc. Rep. 748, 70 N. Y. Supp. IO5."
A method of giving a life estate and at the same time a
power to use the principal is sustained by a divided court in
Life Estate Podaril v. Clark, 91 N. W. O91. In that case
a will conveyed to the testator's wife all his prop-
erty "for her natural lifetime," and recited in an independent
clause immediately following that he further gave her the
privilege to sell or convey the same to whomsoever she might
"see or think best" during her lifetime. The Supreme Court
of Iowa holds that, since the disposition of the life estate and
the power to convey were contained in independent clauses,
the power did not enlarge the life estate into a fee, nor limit
the widow to a conveyance of her life estate only, but that
the widow was given a life estate, and, in addition, the power
to convey the fee, provided she exercised the same during her
lifetime. See I Jarman, Wills (4th Ed.), 362-364; Taft v.
Taft, 130 Mass. 461.
In the matter of the probate of a will, the question in-
volved was whether the testator's signature thereto was can-
canceliation, celled by him, for the purpose of revoking the
Expert will, by drawing fourteen nearly perpendicular
Evidence marks across the letters of his signature. In re
Hopkins' Will, 65 N. E. 175, the Court of Appeals of New
York holds that an expert in handwriting could not testify
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that such marks were not made by the same person who
wrote the signature to the will, from an examination of the
signature of the testator appearing on the will. The ground of
the decision is that such marks do not constitute "writings"
within the meaning of the statute permitting the comparison
of writings by experts. The gencral similarity of statutes
on this subject renders probable the adoption of this con-
struction of the statute. Compare the case of Lansing v.
Russell, 3 Barb. Ch. 325, where experts were allowed to
testify their opinion of the genuineness of a mark, made by
a person in place of a signature. This latter case is held
not applicable to the case in hand.
An uncle verbally agreed with his nephew, a boy of four-
teen, and with the boy's mother and guardian, that if the
Contract boy would accompany him, the uncle, from Ire-
to Devise land, to the uncle's American home, and there
assist him, and accept his care and instruction, he would
treat him as a son and will to him all his property. For
seventeen years the boy faithfully fulfilled his agreement,
but the uncle died intestate, without any rights in innocent
third parties intervening. Under these facts the Supreme
Court of California holds in McCabe v. Healy, 70 Fac.
ioo8, that the nephew was equitably entitled to the estate
subject only to administration. See, however, Maddison v.
Alderson, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 467, where the facts were very
similar, but a different decision was reached. The principle
upon which the court proceeds in the case in hand is thus
stated by Pomeroy (Specific Performance, p. 268) : "Courts
of equity will, under special circumstances, enforce a con-
tract to make a will, or to make a certain testamentary dis-
position; and this may be done even when the agreement
was parol, where, in reliance upon the contract, the promisee
has changed his condition and relations so that a refusal to
complete the agreement would be a fraud upon him." The
relief is not in the nature of ordering a will made, but of
regarding the property as impressed with a trust. One
judge dissents on the ground that the plaintiff can be com-
pensated by the value of his services. "There is nothing,"
he says, "in the nature of such services to justify the con-
clusion or inference that they cannot be compensated for in
money."
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It is generally provided by statute in the various states
that to the general rule that husband and wife are not per-
mitted to testify against each other, there is the
Copetency exception that they may so testify in the case of
violence attempted, done or threatened by the one upon the
other. California has legislation providing substantially as
indicated. In People v. Curiale, 7o Pac. 468, the Supreme
Court of that state holds that violence before marriage is
not within the exception, but that they are still incompetent
to testify in regard to it. See State v. Evans, 138 Mo. 1i6.
In this latter case the court reaches the result upon a very
technical basis: "A wife is only admitted to testify con-
cerning criminal injuries to herself, a wife; not to a woman
who was not, at the time of the injury, the wife of the de-
fendant."
The Supreme Court of Florida holds in Chapin v. Mitchell,
32 Southern, 875, that the law prohibiting a party to an
Transactlon action or proceeding, or person interested in the
with Deceased event, from testifying as a witness in regard to
Person any transaction or communication between such
witness and a person at the time of such examination de-
ceased, insane or lunatic, does not prohibit the admission in
evidence in favor of either party of the shop books and books
of account of either party, in which the charges and entries
shall have been originally made. Nor, it is said, does it
prohibit the introduction in evidence of the suppletory oath
of the party in connection with such books of account, to the
effect that the articles charged therein were delivered, or the
items of labor and services therein charged were actually
performed, and that the entries were made at or about the
time of the transaction, and are the original entries, and
that the charges have not been paid.
